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Firms that operate in the telecommunications industry often have to make large and
risky investments in digital infrastructure. This paper examines how firm size affects
the incentive to invest in infrastructure projects in industry environments that incur
substantial network externalities. We suggest that, in the presence of network
externalities, a firm's rate of growth first declines and then increases with the size of
its user base. An implication of this result is that firms may benefit from making
investments in emerging digital infrastructure early enough to achieve a substantial user
base and to gain that user base before other firms' investments pre-empt them. The results
mean that firms that undertake earlier successful investment may achieve pre-emption
very quickly. The sources of network externalities contribute to the incidence of strategic
alliances in network industries, particularly when coupled with the pressures of
technical uncertainty.
1. Introduction
00
- Firms that operate in or seek to enter the telecommunications industry face
~Z the choice of investing in a wide variety of competing technologies that will
| provide them with necessary digital infrastructure. These technologies range
from Digital Subscriber Lines (xDSL) based on existing twisted-pair wires
g available through local telephone exchanges, to technologies based on
•S communication satellites, to Gigabit Ethernet, ATM, Fiber Distributed Data
fe Interface (FDDI), cable modems and Fast Ethernet, along with other newly
0 emerging technologies. Firms face a severe tension concerning investment
1 incentives in this environment. On the one hand, technical uncertainty limits
<3 the amount and focus of investment that any one firm can undertake. On the
jj other hand, firms that do not invest in technologies that eventually succeed
J risk being locked out of the market. We will argue that this tension is
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particularly strong in industries such as telecommunications that have
substantial network externalities.
In this paper, we examine how firm size affects the incentive to invest in
digital infrastructure projects in environments that have substantial network
externalities. We suggest and show empirically that a firm's rate of growth
first declines and then increases with the size of its user base. Therefore, firms
may benefit from making investments in emerging digital infrastructure early
enough to achieve a substantial user base and to gain that user base before
other firms' investments pre-empt them. Beyond some minimum scale, the
investment incentives tend to increase as a firm's user base grows within a set
of digital services. At the same time, though, the same network externalities
that sometimes give rise to high growth rates may severely limit growth
following investment in unsuccessful technologies. This tension underlies
strategic choices in network industries.
In the next section, we define network externalities, discuss various sources
of network externalities, and outline the expected effects of network
externalities on firm growth rates. We then describe the results of an empirical
examination of the relationship between firm size and firm growth rates. The
analysis examines the size—growth relationship in three industries that have
substantial network externalities. We conclude with a brief discussion of the
strategic implications of the results, which concern alliance strategy and
investment incentives for firms of different sizes.
2. Network Externalities
A network externality is said to exist if the utility that a user derives from the
consumption of a good increases or decreases with the number of other agents
that consume the good (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). A network industry is an
industry in which there are significant network externalities. Economists such
as Cunynghame (1892) and Pigou (1929) have long recognized this
phenomenon, although economic research—other than Liebenstein's (1950)
use of bandwagon and snob effects within a theory of demand— has paid
little attention to network externalities. It was not until the early 1980s that
Carlton and Klamer (1983) and Oren and Smith (1981) developed the
empirical importance of network externalities in the electronic funds transfer
and telecommunications industries. Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986) and
Kat2 and Shapiro (1985, 1986) then provided key conceptual understanding
of the role of network externalities in neoclassical economic theory. Network
externalities have also played a role in organizational theory, meanwhile,
typically through the mode of bandwagon effects and legitimization.
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Sources of Network Externalities
Four main sources of network externalities arise in the economics and
organizational theory literature, including direct physical effects, bandwagon
effects, complementary goods and legitimacy effects. As we discuss below,
more than one source of network externalities may apply to a particular case.
Direct Physical Effects. On-line services provide an example of direct
physical effects. The utility that a consumer derives from joining an on-line
information service such as America Online or Prodigy depends on the
number of individuals, firms and organizations that have joined the network.
The size of the user base is analogous to the number of nodes connected by
the network (Conner, 1995). The simplest example of a network is the simple
star network that characterizes the network of telephones. A phone call from
user X, to user Y, routes through a series of switches Sx and Sr In such a
network, increases in the number of users increases the utility of all
participants in the network. Because individual users ignore the benefits or
harm that they provide to other users when they join or leave the network,
such networks provide sources of network externalities. Many industries, such
as the telecommunication industry in general and the online services industry
in particular, are examples of network industries in which direct physical links
are a source of network externalities.
Bandwagon Effects. Network externalities may also result from the desire
of certain individuals to be in style (Leibenstein, 1950). The bandwagon effect
refers to the extent to which the demand for a commodity increases due to
the fact that others are consuming the same commodity. Examples of com-
modities that create bandwagon effects include the demand for designer jeans,
and the demand for internet access via ISDN, Tl or xDSL. The bandwagon
effect represents the desire of people to purchase goods in order to conform
with the people they wish to associate with or in order to be stylish.
Complementary Goods and Services. Network externalities can also arise
for products that require the presence of a complementary good or service.
For instance, an individual or organization contemplating the purchase of a
computer will be concerned with the number of other individuals and
organizations purchasing compatible hardware. This concern arises because
the variety and amount of software, which is often the essential complement,
that will be supplied for use with any given computer platform is an
increasing function of the number of compatible hardware units that have
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been sold. In the case of personal computers, the large installed base of
computers that use the Wintel architecture allows the software makers to
exploit economies of scale. This in turn results in a greater variety of software
being written for Wintel-based computers. Such externalities often take the
name of indirect network externalities.
The complementary source of indirect network externalities often arises
with the emergence of de facto standards. De facto standards emerge when the
benefits of network externalities are so great that a technology or design may
dominate in terms of market share, creating what users and producers
acknowledge to be a standard (Farrell and Saloner, 1985, 1986; Katz and
Shapiro, 1985, 1986). Standards that emerge in this manner are referred to
as de facto standards because they emerge as a result of competitive market
forces, rather than through de jure imposition by a public agency (David and
Greenstein, 1990). The complementary source of network externalities
sometimes explains the failure of new technology to displace existing
standards. Postrel (1990) provides the example of quadraphonic sound, which
failed to replace stereophonic sound in the 1970s because of the lack of fully
compatible software such as records that provided the quadraphonic format,
even though quadraphonic sound was technologically superior to the older
stereophonic sound. Network externalities may also arise for a durable good
when the quality and availability of after-sales service for the good depends
upon the size of the service network, which in turn depends on the number
of units of the good that have been sold (Katz and Shapiro, 1985).
Externalities that arise from direct physical effects, bandwagon effects and
from indirect complementary goods can occur jointly. For example, in the case
of cellular phones, as more consumers subscribe for cellular services that are
compatible with the GSM (Global Standard for Mobile Communications)
standard, the utility of each existing GSM subscriber directly increases. Fur-
thermore, complement makers will have added incentives to design products
that are specific to the GSM standard. This, in turn, provides GSM subscribers
with indirect externalities. Moreover, consumer desires to maintain current
consumption styles may also create bandwagon demand for cellular phones
as the number of users increases.
Legitimacy Effects. The benefits that organizations derive from organ-
izational legitimacy also may provide a source of network externalities.
Institutional theorists predict that the growth in the number of organizations
belonging to a new organizational form will lead to increased social and
political acceptance (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987).
Numerous ecological studies (e.g. Hannan and Carroll, 1992) suggest that an
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increase in the number of organizations conveys legitimization in the sense
that an organizational form gains the status of being taken for granted. This
taken for grantedness increases the founding rate and survival chances of
organizations within a given form.
In an emerging industry, an increase in the size of the user base of a firm
that belongs to a particular organizational form will provide legitimacy to all
firms that belong to that particular organizational form. This is similar to the
institutional theory arguments regarding organizational legitimacy that arises
in ecological research (e.g. Barnett and Carroll, 1987). While ecological
researchers have focused on the effect of legitimacy on factors vital to the firm,
such as founding and failure, the effects of legitimacy may be considered the
equivalent of an indirect network externality that will affect growth rates.
While legitimacy effects are likely to result in network externalities at early
stages of many industries, we will focus the analysis in this study on industries
in which the first three sources of network externalities tend to arise.
In order to see the effect that network externalities have on firm growth,
we will review the impact of network externalities from the demand side.
Network externalities primarily influence the demand for a product. Thus, in
the presence of positive network externalities, an increase in the size of the
user base increases the value of the product and therefore increases the
demand for the product. These benefits may result from physical, bandwagon
or complementary network externalities. For example, as more complements
become available with increases in the size of the user base, consumers face
lower switching costs that result from having multiple suppliers of the
complement. Furthermore, the presence of multiple suppliers may also reduce
consumer concerns about potential post-purchase opportunism by a single
supplier (Farrell and Gallini, 1988). In an industry that incurs direct network
externalities, such as the telecommunications industry, an increase in the size
of a firm's user base increases the value of its user base to its consumers. This,
in turn, makes the firm more attractive to future consumers and increases the
firm's growth rate. Thus, the theoretical literature on network externalities
suggests that firm size will tend to lead to increased firm growth.
Empirical studies of firm size and growth do not demonstrate the positive
relationship that network externality theory suggests. Instead, the body of
studies that have examined the relationship between firm size and firm
growth rates have found that firm growth rates tend to decline as firms get
larger. While some researchers have sought to explain the observed negative
relationship between firm size and firm growth rates as an artifact of
econometric biases, more sophisticated research has shown that the negative
relationship persists even after controlling for the various econometric issues.
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Some non-econometric explanations for the observed negative relationship
between size and growth remain possible, such as the nature of firm learning
(Jovanovic, 1982) and the irreversible nature of investments in capacity
(Cabral, 1995). Nonetheless, the dominant empirical conclusion of large-
scale, multiple-industry studies is that firm growth tends to decline with size
or, at best, is stable with respect to size.
A limiting feature of the conclusion concerning the size—growth relation-
ship, though, is that prior studies tend to assume that a unique growth process
holds for the entire size distribution of firms across a broad range of industries.
However, there is no reason to assume that all firms in all industries should
follow a similar growth process. The increasing importance of the so-called
'high-technology' industries, which tend to have network externalities,
suggests that growth patterns may well vary from industry to industry. The
traditional results may tend to arise in industries that do not involve substantial
network externalities, while the opposite relationship may arise in network
industries.
In this paper, we predict that growth rates first decline and then increase
with firm size in network industries. We note that firm size provides many
benefits to firms that operate in network industries, leading to a positive
relationship between firm size and firm growth. However, the positive
benefits from network externalities often accrue to the firm only after its user
base reaches a critical mass. Thus, as in all industries, a young firm grows
rapidly if it successfully navigates the difficulties of early competition. In
non-network industries, a firm's rate of growth tends to slow down once the
firm has reached a minimum efficient scale. However, in network externality
environments, we expect that once the firm's user base reaches a critical mass,
which will typically be a size greater than the minimum efficient scale, the
firm's growth rate will tend to increase as the firm begins to reap the benefits
of network externalities. Thus, we expect to find that growth rates
decline and then increase with firm size in network industries. We believe that
a firm's rate of growth is an important predictor of both current and future
profits for the firm, as well as a key determinant of firm survival in dynamic
industries.
Of course, the benefits from network externalities will not increase
monotonically for all firm sizes. Once a firm establishes its products in the
marketplace, additional increases in user base are unlikely to increase a
consumer's valuation of the product by as much as prior increases added to
value. Furthermore, a market leader's vulnerability to competitive threats
constrains the leader's ability to extract rents from consumers. Thus, growth
rates are unlikely to increase monotonically with firm size. However,
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investigating the second-order effects of firm size on growth rates is beyond
the empirical scope of this paper.
3. Methods and Measures
In order to empirically test our prediction that firm growth first declines and
then rises with firm size in network industries, we examine the relationship
between firm size and firm growth rates in the semiconductor, prepackaged
software, and computer communications equipment industries. Each of these
three industries is characterized by network externalities because products in
each of these industries require the presence of a complementary good.
The value of a semiconductor chip depends on the cost and availability of
software and hardware that is tailored to that particular platform. For
example, Digital's Alpha chip tended to be faster than the comparable Intel
Pentium chips that were available at the time. However, the wide availability
of software tailored for the Intel chips and the paucity of software tailored for
the Alpha chip contributed to the Pentium chip's success in the marketplace.
A similar argument applies to the computer communications equipment
industry. The sources of network externalities in the computer commu-
nications equipment industry include the availability of trained professionals
and the availability of software that is tailored to a particular hardware pro-
duct. For example, CISCO, a leading provider of networking hardware such
as routers and LAN switches requires software tailored to its hardware
product. As CISCO'S user base increases, a greater variety of hardware will
become available for its hardware products, giving users an incentive to
purchase products that others are using.
For the prepackaged software industry, the sources of software network
externality include a desire to economize on post-purchase learning costs and
to share files easily with others. For instance, the typical spreadsheet program
is a complicated productivity package that may require many hours or days
to master. By using a program that others are using, individuals are able to
take advantage of direct avenues for economizing on learning costs, such as
tutorials and guidebooks, which tend to become available more abundantly
and cheaply as a program's user base increases. Furthermore, software
programs such as computer games often incur bandwagon effects.
We use a regression approach to test our prediction that firm size will have
a U-shaped relationship with firm growth rates. We use a longitudinal
research design and index all variables in the regression equation for both firm
segment (/) and time (t). Using a pooled cross-sectional notation, the
following equation describes the growth relationship:
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a
In the equation, S
1,-^ +1 represents the size of firm segment / in period / + 1, X,_,
is a vector of independent control variables, d represents the time between
each observation and »,_, is normally distributed with mean \i.t and variance
a
2t. We calculated growth rates on an annual basis, so that d takes on value 1.
We examine the growth rate of a firm's business segments, which are
industry-specific lines of business, rather than examining the growth rate of
each corporation. Given the existence of diversified firms in many industries,
we decided to use a segment-level size measure rather than a firm-level
measure because the segment-level measure is more consistent with the
conceptual sources of network externalities. We used continuously com-
pounded growth in sales to measure increases in size. Over shorter time
periods, growth measures that are based on variables such as employment and
assets are likely to be sticky. On the other hand, growth measures based on
sales will demonstrate greater year-to-year change than the stickier measures
of size such as assets or employment. Furthermore, as firms continually
redefine their boundaries by engaging in activities such as outsourcing, sales
are a better measure of firm size than assets or employment.
We collected the segment sales data from the Business Information File
(BUS) produced by COMPUSTAT. The BUS file provides information for all
publicly traded firms identified at the four-digit SIC level, disaggregated for
up to 10 different industry segments for the period 1978-1996. Across the
three industries, we obtained information for —1000 businesses with almost
8000 firm-year combinations.
The literature on network effects suggests that the size of the installed base
affects firm performance (Hartman and Teece, 1990; Conner, 1995). In order
to estimate the installed base effect, we measured the size variable by
cumulating segment sales over a 2-year period. In order to test for the
expected non-monotonic relationship between size and growth rates, we
included a quadratic term of firm size as an independent variable in the
regression. We expected the coefficient of the size variable to be negative and
significant in each of the three industries, and the coefficient of the square
term to be positive and significant in each of the three industries. In addition
to the independent variables we also included business-level control variables
for age and business focus, as well as environmental controls for industry
concentration, industry growth, and density.
Finally, we also explored the possibility that the results were biased by attri-
tion of segments in the sample. Mansfield (1962) notes that if the probability
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TABLE 1. Fixed Effects Model of the Impact of Size on Growth: Results from Three
Network Industries (Least Squares with Group Dummy variables and ftriod Effects)
Log cum size*
(Log cum size)
2
Control varUblts
Herfindahl Index
Log age
(Log age)
2
Focus
Hazard
Constant
Adjusted R
2
Observations
No. of segments
0
Years
(1)
Semiconductors and
related devices
-0.508***
(0.026)
b
0.025***
(0.003)
-2.728***
(0.827)
-0.072
(0.113)
0.089*
(0.049)
0.389***
(0.130)
-1.287**
(0.660)
1.424***
(0.211)
0.33102
1673
189
1978-1996
(2)
Prepackaged
software
-0.431***
(0.015)
0.021***
(0.002)
-0.458
(0.480)
-0.030
(0.080)
0.088**
(0.039)
0.864***
(0.101)
-0.383
(0.517)
0.375**
(0.149)
0.33594
4954
708
1978-1996
(3)
Computer
communications
equipment
-0.478***
(0.032)
0.027***
(0.003)
-0.362
(0.328)
0.260*
(0.161)
-0.169**
(0.085)
0.318*
(0.178)
-0.999***
(0.361)
1.674***
(0.277)
0.40445
1278
172
1978-1996
Column 1: SIC Code 3674—Semiconductor! and Related Devices; column 2: SIC Code 7372-
Prepaclcaged Software; column 3: SIC Code 3576—Computer Communication! Equipment.
*P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01 (two-tailed tern).
*Log cum size refen to the log of cumulative busineu segment lala.
Standard errors in parentheses.
of firm survival increases with firm size, then the observed negative
relationship between firm growth and firm size may stem from the higher
failure rates of slow-growing, small firms. To control for sample selection bias,
we used Lee's (1983) generalization of Heckman's (1979) two-stage sample
selection estimation process.
For each industry, we created a data set that pooled the yearly observations
on each firm segment. While one can reasonably assume that growth across
firms is independent of growth across firm segments, it is unlikely that
growth within the same firm segment across time periods will be indepen-
dent. Thus, the error term in a pooled cross-section time-series model is likely
to correlate serially. In order to remedy this problem, we included dummy
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variables to account for the effects of omitted variables that were specific to
the individual firm segments but stayed constant over time, and the effects
that were specific to each time period but stayed constant over all firm
segments in the period. This approach is called the least-squares dummy
variables (LSDV) approach or the two-way fixed effects model.
An alternative approach to the serial correlation problem is to treat the
individual and time-specific effects as random variables. This approach is the
random effects model. We used both the fixed effect and random effects
approaches in the analysis. However, the results of the Hausman test and the
Lagrange multiplier test indicated that the random effects model and the
ordinary least-squares model did not fit the data as well as the fixed effects
model. Thus, we only report results for the fixed effects models that we used
in the estimation of the growth equation.
Table 1 presents the results of the statistical analysis we conducted to test
the prediction that there is a U-shaped relationship between firm size and firm
growth rates. Our prediction received strong support in each of the three
network industries. Table 1 shows that growth rates decline as size increases,
until a threshold size is reached, after which growth rates increase with size.
The central implication of the result for firms operating in a network exter-
nality environment is to underline their need to build a large user base as
quickly as possible. Thus, firms have an incentive to make early investments
in emerging technologies in order to achieve a large user base. Furthermore,
beyond some minimum scale, the investment incentives tend to increase as
the firm's user base grows.
4. Conclusion
The finding that business growth eventually tends to increase with size, once
past some minimum point, in network externality industries has strong
strategic implications. The central implication of our study is that firms have
a special incentive, over and above the investment incentives in non-network
industries, to make early investments and thereby attempt to achieve a large
user base in an emerging technology. So long as there is some finite limit to
market demand for a good, the first firms to gain substantial sales growth will
tend to attain lower costs and be able to pre-empt later investors from
achieving potential growth. Therefore, firms face substantial incentives to
invest early enough in the hope of gaining a substantial user base before other
firms' investments pre-empt them.
We will briefly discuss two additional implications of the results,
concerning alliance incentives and investment incentives for different types of
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firms. First, the growth—size relationship in network externalities contributes
to incentives to undertake alliance strategies in network industries. The
alliance incentive arises from two causes: technical uncertainty and the basic
sources of network externalities.
In part, the alliance incentive arises when the flip side of the growth—size
relationship in network industries combines with the presence of substantial
technical uncertainty. The flip side of the growth—size relationship in network
industries is that firms that invest in unsuccessful technologies will tend to
achieve even lower growth than in unsuccessful investments in non-network
industries. That is, customers will be particularly loath to adopt network
externality products that do not fare well in the market. This risk is often
substantial, as technical success in network industries commonly depends on
competition among multiple core technologies as well as uncertain
development of complementary goods. Thus, firms in network industries tend
to face a severe tension. On the one hand, firms risk substantial losses if they
invest in technologies that fail. On the other hand, firms that wait for one or
more technologies to dominate others risk being too late to invest successfully.
This tension will often create particularly high competitive turnover in
industries that face both ongoing technical change and substantial network
externalities. The tension between investment uncertainty and growth
incentives contributes to the incidence of strategic alliances in network
industries, as firms seek to share investment risks.
In addition to alliance incentives that arise from technical uncertainty,
several factors that arise from the sources of network externalities also
contribute to the frequency of alliances in network industries. Alliance
strategies may include letting other firms clone or license your technology,
entering into alliances with other industry incumbents or allying with firms
that possess necessary complementary assets (Axelrod et ai, 1995; Conner,
1995). Alliances often provide immediate critical mass in sales to help achieve
the network externality benefits of direct physical effects and the bandwagon
effects of consumption. Alliances provide access to a range of capabilities
needed to develop focal and complementary goods, where the capabilities are
often well beyond the scope of any single firm. Moreover, alliances among
competing and complementary firms may reduce organizational diversity in
emerging industries and thereby increase the legitimacy of the existing
organizations. The firms entering into an alliance relationship seek to balance
their interest in building a user base with their desire to control the
technology in order to extract rents. The strategy of entering into vertical
and/or horizontal alliance relationships is often the only viable strategy for
startup firms or diversifying entrants seeking to enter an emerging industry.
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Although alliances are common in network industries, firms sometimes
attempt to dominate a new market by making independent investments.
Independent investment is often coupled with penetration pricing whereby
the firm prices its product below cost in the early stages of the product's
lifecycle in order to gain user base. However, the decision to make indepen-
dent investments in building a user base is typically a perilous route for the
firm, given that consumers take into account the expected size of the network
while making their buying decisions. Firms making independent investments
to build a user base must frequently overcome technical constraints and
legitimacy concerns in order to market products that are systemic in nature.
Furthermore, the firms often lack access to complementary skills that they
require for the product to attain its full value. A widely cited example of a
failure of this strategy is Sony's decision to market its Betamax format video
system independently. Typically, then, large firms seeking to establish new
technologies for existing services in which they have an established presence
in the marketplace the strategy are most likely to make substantial indepen-
dent investments in building a user base.
Finally, the results suggest a key refinement to our traditional view
concerning the relative investment incentives of small and large businesses
and, similarly, of industry incumbents and industry entrants. We often think
that small firms and industry entrants have the most incentive to invest in
new technology, in order to challenge large incumbents. In this traditional
view, established leaders often have lesser incentives to invest in new tech-
nology, both because they may have reached their growth limits and because
they pay more attention to protecting their existing technical positions rather
than expanding beyond them. However, in industries that incur network
externalities, such as the telecommunications sector, firm size and incumbency
may encourage new investment rather than discourage it. The incumbent
investment incentive may be particularly strong when the emerging
technology provides existing services, such as internet access via xDSL or
ISDN. In such cases, incumbents risk rapid displacement if entrants gain the
growth benefits of network externalities before them. In addition, however,
incumbents face the same investment incentives as any other firms when faced
with new technology that provides new services, such as cellular services in
emerging economies. Indeed, to the extent that their incumbency provides
organizational legitimacy or access to complementary goods that contribute
to network externalities, incumbents may have greater incentive than
entrants to invest, even in cases of new services. Therefore, industry incum-
bents are likely to undertake major investment roles in network industries.
This paper examines how firm size affects the incentive to invest in
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infrastructure projects in environments that are characterized by network
externalities. We suggest and show empirically that a firm's rate of growth
first declines and then increases with the size of its user base. Therefore, firms
may benefit from making investments in emerging technologies early enough
to achieve a substantial user base and to gain that user base before other firms'
investments pre-empt them. Moreover, beyond some minimal scale, the
investment incentives tend to increase as a firm's user base grows within a set
of digital technologies.
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